INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of several recent appalling corporate failures in some developed countries, 1 the concern for the regulation of accountants 2 has gained a fresh stimulus, which is evident in the current academic debates and corresponding legislative reforms being made in the United States, Australia and Canada.
3 Investor confidence is the Holy Grail of the successful operation of securities markets around the world and adequate measures for investor protection are central to this confidence in the market.
Every jurisdiction adopts certain strategies for protecting the investing public from abusive practices in securities markets. Mandatory disclosure requirement comes ahead of all other strategies. 4 The creation and maintenance of investor confidence in a market are greatly dependent on the integrity of the market, which is demonstrated through the timely and credible disclosure of material facts facilitating informed investment decisions. Disclosures in prospectuses aim to eliminate information asymmetry between corporations and their prospective investors. This elimination may be possible only through full, fair and timely disclosures of material facts and their utilisation by the investing public. But in reality, the notion of ensuring full and fair disclosure may seem to be largely illusive, perhaps owing to the fact that "problems at which modern securities regulation is directed are as old as the cupidity of sellers and the gullibility of buyers," 5 as observed by Professor Louis Loss, the intellectual father of securities law in the United States. Sometimes it is clearly admitted that the eradication of securities fraud and manipulation is impossible. 7 However, corporate abusive practices may be minimised to a reasonable extent by effective regulation of market players. With this end in view, securities regulation commenced in the early eighteenth century;
8 and the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) set out the objectives of securities regulation as: protecting investors, ensuing market fairness and efficiency and reducing systemic risks. 9 Despite some instances of regulatory failures in securities markets, the regulation of market players is now considered essential for investor protection, 10 and criminal sanctions now play a pivotal role in policing corporations.
11
It has been argued that investors have the right to receive accurate disclosures and the persons who are at fault in infringing on that right "should be held liable, whether they are primary or secondary actors." 12 In addressing the post-Enron situation, the United States Congress has explained that auditors play the role of guardian of the securities market, 13 and lawmakers were arguably forced to enact new legislation predominantly concerning accounting professionals in order to protect investors from the market misfeasance in the wake of the collapse of corporate giants.
14 Referring to the corporate collapses in Australia in the 1980s, Bosch (the former chairman of the Australian securities watchdog) observed that auditors must be blamed for misleading or outrageous disclosure by corporations. 15 There has been a demand for enhanced liability of accountants in Canada following the effects of the Enron incident on domestic markets. 16 Legislative initiatives have been 84 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 26:81 L. REV. 575 (2003) . 17. For the purposes of this study, the phrase "defective prospectus" means a prospectus which contains misleading and deceptive statements or omits to state a material fact which was required to be stated under the relevant law.
18. The reasons for choosing Ontario jurisdiction from Canada will be discussed in the methodology section below.
19 18 It focuses on the similarities and differences between these three jurisdictions in respect of provisions concerning criminal liabilities of auditors and lawyers under securities law with special reference to postEnron legal reforms, defences available to this liability and penalties applicable to prospectus criminal offences.
METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS
The U.S., Australia and Canada have been chosen for this comparative review because of their similarities in legal traditions, regulatory philosophies and reform measures undertaken following the Enron collapse. They belong to the common law family, follow a mandatory disclosure regime and have enacted new legislation to address the regulatory problems relevant to the post-Enron securities market. Although securities regulation in all of these federations was initially effected at state or provincial level, some significant changes have taken place in their regulatory approach over the past few decades. abolished its state regulation, replacing with federal regulation of securities through the establishment of the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) in 1991. 21 Although there has been an effort to unify securities law and regulation in Canada, it is still following securities regulation at province and territory levels.
22 However, Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA), a forum of Canadian securities regulators, has been "providing for regulatory cooperation, harmonisation of regulatory standards, coordination of rules and dealing with regulatory issues of common interest." 23 The CSA is publicly known as the "virtual" national regulator although no one stop securities regulator exists in Canada. 24 Ontario has been chosen from amongst the 13 jurisdictions in Canada for this paper mainly because it is the largest and most prominent jurisdiction for the purpose of securities regulation in Canada.
25
Both primary and secondary materials are used in this article. In addition to published materials, some eminent scholars are consulted for the clarity and applicability of recent development in these three jurisdictions.
Criminal liabilities for defective prospectuses are imposed under both securities law and criminal law. This study is concerned with the liabilities under securities law that can be enforced through judicial actions. Administrative actions against prospectus offences and liabilities under criminal law fall beyond this article. 
PROFESSIONALS' RESPONSIBILITIES TRIGGERING CRIMINAL LIABILITIES FOR DEFECTIVE PROSPECTUSES

Auditors' Responsibilities
Accountancy is a thriving profession which is able to act as "private gatekeeper" to the capital market.
26 It has been argued that accountants play a vital role in presenting distorted financial reports of corporations to the public. 27 The role of auditors is perhaps the most significant of all the various functions performed by accountants in society. 28 The primary role of an auditor "is to review, analyze, and determine the validity" of the claims intended to be made by his/her client in the prospectus. 29 More importantly, auditors are sometimes considered to be independent guarantors of truth and fairness in the financial disclosure of corporations. 30 Generally, auditing of corporate financial statements is intended to show the true financial health of the entity to third parties such as securities regulators, creditors and present and prospective investors through making a fair presentation of the companies' financial affairs. 31 Consistently, it is a reality in the securities market that investors use the audited financial statements for investment purposes and thereby firms raise capital from the public. 32 Auditing is thus central to the public confidence in financial disclosures; absent this confidence, "the capital will dry up and the system will be crippled." 33 This is so because an auditor is considered to be an intermediary between firms and investors in respect of corporate financial statements.
34
In other words, auditors are theoretically "an arm's-length third party" and they are supposed to work beyond any undue management pressures.
35
Therefore, auditors have an extremely significant role to play in making reliable corporate disclosures to the public in the market for initial public offerings (IPOs). In appreciation of that role, suits for professional misconduct against accountants have amplified dramatically over the past two decades, 36 where they are often sued by third parties who suffered loss by relying upon the audited financial statements of companies. 37 Although the victims of a corporate failure may sue others such as directors, lawyers, and underwriters, accountants are especially targeted for lawsuits where the failed entity recently received a positive audit report.
38
Lawyers' Responsibilities
Lawyers are primarily responsible for the verification of the legal requirements for the prospectus although they get involved in the process of an IPO at a much later stage than that of the auditors. 39 However, both lawyers and auditors are generally regarded as "gatekeepers." Coffee defines the term "gatekeeper" as "independent professionals who serve investors by preparing, verifying, or assessing the disclosures that they receive."
40
Regarding the function of securities lawyers, he maintains that they provide an opinion to the underwriter that the prospectus contains all material information in relation to the issue and issuer. 41 He argues that securities lawyers perform multiple roles such as: advocate, engineer and gatekeeper. 42 He asserts that "the attorney is the field marshall of the disclosure process."
43
In discussing professionals' roles in the context of Enron, Rhode and Paton argue that lawyers "passively acquiesce in client fraud. S. 164, 191 (1994) . Although this observation was made under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 1934 and Rule 10b-5 which applies to the secondary market, the observation should be still relevant to the disclosure in prospectuses in respect of imposing liability on individuals.
In brief, lawyers provide advice to issuers of securities on the legal requirements of disclosures in prospectuses and certify the compliance with the relevant law. Investors are believed to buy securities based on those disclosures. At the same time lawyers are also responsible to make the issuer aware of legal requirements and consequences of noncompliance. Therefore they play a significant role in respect of an IPO and they could be held liable for inaccurate advice.
RATIONALE FOR PROFESSIONALS' CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE PROSPECTUSES
Rationale for Auditors' Criminal Liability
The rationale of the imposition of liability on outside professionals such as auditors and lawyers was debated extensively in the early 1990s.
46 But opponents' arguments could not prevent accountants' liability for defective disclosure by corporations and therefore proponents' arguments eventually prevail.
47 Auditors' liability is attributable to their "substantial participation" or "intricate involvement" in the preparation of a prospectus. 48 The U.S. Supreme Court in Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank noted that secondary actors in the securities market may be held liable as primary violators where "any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be held liable as primary violator. . . ."
49
Langevoort argues that outside professionals such as accountants and lawyers often have much influence over corporate disclosures, in terms of both forms and contents, which can deceive investors, and therefore they should be made liable for defective disclosure even though REV. 193, 220 (1992) . With respect to fraudulent activity such as misrepresentations, omissions and schemes to defraud under securities law ( § 10(b) of the Security Exchange Act of 1934), the judiciary recognizes two types of civil liability: primary and secondary. Primary liability is imposed on those who directly violate securities law, whilst secondary liability is ascribed to those who provide substantial assistance to the direct violators. See IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980 REV. 198, 198 (1992) .
54. Warren, supra note 42, at 387. their roles may be sometimes less direct. 50 Although courts had difficulty in the past in resolving the issue of accountants' liability for a securities transaction, the modern judicial pronouncements clearly recognise that "if an accountant had fraudulently certified materially misleading financial statements that were placed in a prospectus distributed to the investing public, a court would find a sufficient connection with the securities transaction to warrant liability." 51 This liability is of a primary nature. This is because an audit report is argued to be an actual representation and therefore auditors are exposed to primary liability for defective disclosures, although other aspects of the functions of a certified public accountant such as the preparation of financial statements may trigger secondary liability.
52
In line with the current arguments for accountants' or auditors' liabilities, Tomasic, by referring to the wave of corporate collapse of the 1980s, observes that they (auditors) are easily blamed for corporate failures.
53
Now the situation has become even worse. Although auditors have for a long time been held liable for defective prospectuses, their statutory liabilities have not yet been clearly articulated in the legislation of many countries. As a result, their conviction largely depends upon the judicial approach to the interpretation of a particular offence committed in relation to prospectus disclosures.
Rationale for Lawyers' Criminal Liability
Securities regulation involves complicated laws and procedures; given that complexity, lawyers' role concerning an IPO is critical. 54 Failure of lawyers to perform their role properly ultimately helps the issuer commit offences. 55 This is so because the issuer could not have issued the prospectus to the public had the lawyer warned the issuer of defects in the prospectus. Thus lawyers are in a position to prevent the issuer from going public with a defective prospectus. 56 Hence lawyers should be held liable for defective prospectuses and they are sometimes considered primary violators for material misstatements or omissions included in prospectuses.
57
It is also argued that professionals such as lawyers, auditors and underwriters may be held liable for mere participation in the process of prospectus preparation, because their participation "can provide an implicit certification" to the investing public about the accuracy of disclosures.
58
Similarly, in dealing with a case involving deceptive conduct in connection of the sale of securities, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California held that simple participation of professionals might trigger liability.
59
Auditors and lawyers are exposed to both civil and criminal liabilities for their faults committed in providing their professional service.
60 Historically a debate emerged regarding their civil liability, based on the doctrine of privity of contract, that this liability was limited to parties to the contract in exclusion of third parties who became victim of the accountants' or lawyers' wrongs.
61 That notion has changed over time 62 and professionals' fiduciary duty of care has been extended by the judiciary to non-clients third parties who are adversely affected by their professional services.
63
Even some jurisdictions have extended this duty to the public in general. 64 In so doing the Thus auditors and lawyers are now exposed to an extended civil liability regime. However, the doctrine of privity is not quite relevant to the discussion of this article because criminal liability is premised on the wrong committed against the society or state as a whole, rather than against any individuals.
To distinguish between these two, it can be briefly described that civil liability aims to compensate the persons who incurred loss or damage by relying on audited financial statements included in a prospectus; whereas criminal liabilities purport to save the society by deterring the delinquent accountants. Criminal liabilities are imposed by statutes such as securities legislation and the law of crimes; whilst civil liabilities are ascribed under both the law of tort and statutes such as contract law and securities law.
Regarding The SOX'02 was legislated in "response to the massive accounting frauds at companies," and it concentrated on "improving the accounting oversight of publicly traded companies."
73 Perhaps the greatest emphasis has been given under the SOX'02 to addressing corporate accounting issues in a bid to protect investors and regain public confidence in the market. Under section 101(a), the SOX'02 creates the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), a new federal agency to oversee accounting firms that perform corporate audits. A set of new rules and procedures for auditors and issuers has also been included in this legislation. 74 It also requires certification of accuracy of companies' financial statements on a continuing basis by the CEOs and chief financial officers (CFOs) of a reporting company; failure of which triggers enhanced criminal sanctions. 75 Section 307 of the SOX'02 specifically imposes responsibility on lawyers. It empowers the SEC to issue rules "setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way in the representation of issuers." An attorney under this section is required "to report evidence of material violation of securities gov.au/html/comact/browse/TOCN.htm, considerably deals with the regulation of auditors and auditing of companies, and continuing disclosure relevant to the secondary law, or fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or any agent thereof." Lawyers should submit their reports to either the chief legal counsel or the CEO or the equivalent thereof as required under section 307(1). Making such a report alone does not relieve lawyers from their obligations. Section 307(2) provides that if the person who receives the report does not act properly on the evidence reported, lawyers are required to report further "to the audit committee of the board of directors of the issuer or to another committee of the board of directors comprised solely of directors not employed directly or indirectly by the issuer, or to the board of directors." A failure in making such a report will eventually make the attorney liable both civilly and criminally.
The SOX'02 amends the provisions of the SEA'34, the basic legislation governing the secondary securities market in the U.S., whilst the primary market is governed under, inter alia, the SA'33. It is not clear why the SOX'02 did not change any provision of the SA'33. One reason may be that the scandals that tempted the Congress to make new law took place in the U.S. secondary market. Whatever may be the reason, its silence about the amendment to the SA'33 generates doubts whether this legislation applies to a defective prospectus which contains audited financial statements and an audit report to that effect. The intent of the Congress in this regard is not clear and it seems that "the courts are left to divine Congress's ultimate intent."
76
Although a case reference of its application to a defective prospectus is yet to be found, some experts in U.S. securities law are of the opinion that the SOX'02 may be applicable to defective prospectuses in some respects. Relying on those expert opinions, we will assume for this study that the SOX'02 applies to defective prospectuses although it is still uncertain.
77 Penal provisions of this legislation will be discussed in later appropriate sections from relevant aspects.
The The CLERPA'04 particularly amended the requirements of publicly listed companies and deals considerably with, amongst other things, the regulation of auditors and auditing of companies, continuing corporate disclosure which is relevant to the secondary securities market. Similar to the SOX'02, the applicability of the CLERPA'04 to the prospectus disclosure requirements is questionable. However, in response to personal contact with this writer, experts of Australian securities law are of the view that the CLERPA'04 does not apply to prospectus disclosures and the prospectus regime was adequately amended by the Corporate Law Economic Law Reform Program Act 1999 (CLERPA'99) which was given effect from 13 March 2000.
The CLERPA'04 is basically a part of the major corporate law reform program undertaken by the federal government under which the CLERPA'99 was enacted. Incidentally the CLERPA'04 came into existence after the incidents of some spectacular publicly traded corporate failures. Therefore it primarily addresses the issues of disclosures by companies listed on the stock exchanges. It significantly reformed the corporate fund-raising regime and the CLERPA'04 does not explicitly amend any provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (CA'01) governing prospectus criminal liabilities. Based on both the expert opinions consulted and the explanations given above, it is assumed in this study that the CLERPA'04 does not affect the subject matter of this article and therefore no post-Enron reforms in Australia are relevant to this discussion. However, such inaction will be discussed in this study in reference to the other two jurisdictions.
Compared to the U.S. and Australian reforms, the post-Enron reforms in Canada are very clear regarding their applicability to prospectus liabilities. The U.S. corporate scandals impacted Canada. Following the path of the U.S. government, the Ontario government tabled Bill 198 for reforms aimed at regaining investor confidence shattered by the U.S. corporate disasters coupled with some domestic incidents. 81 The Bill was known as An Act to The BMA'02 also enhanced penalties for offences regarding prospectus disclosures. These are discussed below.
LEGAL PROVISIONS CONCERNING PROSPECTUS CRIMINAL LIABILITIES
In the aftermath of the stock market debacle in October 1929 in the U.S., the Securities Act 1933 (SA'33) introduced securities regulation at federal level alongside the preexisting state regulation. The SA'33 incorporated the disclosure philosophy for the first time in the United States. As expounded by the U.S. Supreme Court, the fundamental purpose of the federal securities laws is "to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor."
83 Previously the U.S. securities markets had been regulated by respective state regulatory bodies alone, in pursuance of the paternalistic merit philosophy. The Congress passed the SA'33 "to protect investors during the initial offering of a security."
84 One of the prime purposes of the SA'33 is "to provide the investor with enough information to make a sound economic decision in purchasing a security." 85 Under section 6 of the SA'33, a company willing to go public is required to register its registration statement or prospectus with the Securities and Exchange Commission (US-SEC). Section 10 of this Act prescribes the information to be included in a prospectus. The prescribed contents include all material information regarding the nature of the securities, issue and issuer necessary for making educated investment decisions. It follows a "general disclosure test." Sections 17 and 24 make fraudulent and deceptive disclosures an offence. The SA'33 ascribes both civil and criminal liabilities 96 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 26:81 86. See Securities Act of 1933, § § 11-12 (1933) (describes civil liabilities for defective prospectus). 87. Backer, supra note 70, at 985. 88. Section 728(1) does not actually use the term "prospectus." Instead it uses "disclosure documents" which include: "Prospectuses, short-form prospectuses, profile statements and offer information statements." Corporations Act, 2001, c. 6D, § 709 (2005) (Austl.). "Prospectus" is a common term used widely in respect of raising funds by corporations. The term "prospectus" has been used in this study to denote all sorts of disclosure documents issued by corporations for the purposes of initial public offerings.
89. Corporations Act, 2001, c. 6D, § 728(1) (Austl.).
for a defective prospectus.
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Regarding criminal liabilities for defective prospectuses, section 24 of the SA'33, as quoted in the next section, imposes liability on any person who willfully violates prospectus requirements set out in this Act or in any bylaws promulgated thereunder.
Although this section does not categorically identify the persons who are liable for committing an offence, numerous judicial interpretations of this section have vividly specified that all members of a coalition of the prospectus are criminally liable for defective disclosure in a registration statement. The coverage of the above expression "any person" is discussed below, which will demonstrate that auditors and lawyers could be caught under criminal liability entrenched in the SA'33. In addition, they (auditors and lawyers) can be sued as principal violators under the SOX'02.
87
In Australia, disclosure requirements in prospectuses are governed under Chapter 6D of the CA'01. Under this Chapter, section 728(1) provides that a person must not offer securities to the public under a prospectus 88 which includes misleading or deceptive statements or omits material information required by 710, 711, 712, 713, 714 or 715 of this Act from the prospectus.
89
These sections set out some general and specific disclosure tests. For example, section 710 provides that a prospectus must contain all the material information that would be reasonably required to make informed judgment of the offer by the investors or their professional advisors. The onus is on the issuer to determine whatever information they believe would be useful for investors or their financial advisors to make educated investment decisions. In addition to this so-called "general disclosure test," the CA also requires the issuer to disclose categorically rights and liabilities attached to the underlying securities, and the operational records and financial health of the issuer. Section 711 is concerned with the terms and conditions of the offer, the formation and promotion of the issuer, and interest and fees paid to the persons involved in the making of the offer. Sections 714 and 715 deal with the disclosure of risks associated with the offer, the nature of the issuer's business and the use of funds to be raised through the prospectus. Therefore, a cursory construal of the requirements of disclosure in prospectuses shows that the issuers are obligated to disclose certain information to a reasonable extent in addition to general disclosure requirements. It would be a contravention of these requirements for the prospectus to contain misleading or deceptive statements and omit from the prospectus a fact which was required to have been included. Both civil and criminal liabilities apply to the contravention of section 728(1).
90
Ascribing criminal liability for the contravention of section 728(1), section 728(3) provides that it will be an offence if the misleading or deceptive statement or omission or new circumstance is "materially adverse from the point of view of an investor."
91 To identify the breach of this section, it has been stated that "criminal liability is imposed where the result of a contravention of section 728(1) was that 'bad news' was withheld from investors."
92
The above discussion shows the criminal liability applies to the violation of prospectus requirements; persons liable for such violation are discussed below. It may be noted here that post-Enron legal reforms in Australia did not affect these provisions.
Canadian securities laws, like those in the USA and Australia, require companies willing to go public to obtain regulatory approval for issuing prospectuses to the public. There are both long and short forms of prospectuses. Generally a prospectus under Ontario securities law should contain all material information regarding "the company, business, management, finances, existing securities, and the securities being qualified." 93 The prospectus should be drafted in such a simple manner that investors generally can read it. 94 The responsibility of the securities regulator is to ensure that prospectuses embody "full, true, and plain disclosure of material facts relating to the securities issued or proposed to be distributed and shall comply with the requirements of Ontario securities law." (a) makes a statement in any material, evidence or information submitted to the Commission, a Director, any person acting under the authority of the Commission or the Executive Director or any person appointed to make an investigation or examination under this Act that, in a material respect and at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is misleading or untrue or does not state a fact that is required to be stated or that is necessary to make the statement not misleading; (b) makes a statement in any application, release, report, preliminary prospectus, prospectus, return, financial statement, information circular, take-over bid circular, issuer bid circular or other document required to be filed or furnished under Ontario securities law that, in a material respect and at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is misleading or untrue or does not state a fact that is required to be stated or that is necessary to make the statement not misleading; or (c) contravenes Ontario securities law, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $5 million or to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years less a day, or to both. 1994, c. 11, s. 373; 2002, c. 22, s. 181 (1) . Exemption (1.1) Clauses (1)(a) and (b) do not apply to a statement made or given to the Commission in a submission in respect of a proposed rule or policy.
97. Johnston, supra note 94, at 271.
The OSA'90 makes certain disclosure or non-disclosure of material facts a punishable offence. Offences have been split into three types: general offences, offences by directors and/or officers; and offences relating to insider trading. General offences are contained in section 122(1) of the OSA'90.
96
It is a general offence under section 122(1)(a) to submit to the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) or its (OSC's) representatives statements that are misleading, untrue or omits to include material facts. Section 122(1) (b) provides that the inclusion of any statement made in any required documents including prospectuses that is misleading or untrue or contains omission in respect of a material fact is an offence. Section 122(1)(c) is wider than the preceding two sections. According to section 122(1)(c), any contraventions of securities laws of Ontario are punishable offences. The expression "misleading, untrue or contains omissions" as embodied in sections 122(1)(a) & (b) encapsulates the statutory definition of "misrepresentation" contained in section 1(1) of the OSA'90. Given the wider scope of section 122(1)(c), it has been argued that any offensive violation of Ontario securities legislation can be prosecuted under this penal provision. A person or company shall not, directly or indirectly, engage or participate in any act, practice or course of conduct relating to securities or derivatives of securities that the person or company knows or reasonably ought to know, (a) results in or contributes to a misleading appearance of trading activity in, or an artificial price for, security or derivative of a security; or (b) perpetrates a fraud on any person or company.
Section 126.2 prohibits persons and companies from making a misleading or untrue statement in relation to securities. It reads that:
A person or company shall not make a statement that the person or company knows or reasonably ought to know, (a) in a material respect and at the time and in the light of circumstances under which it is made, is misleading or untrue or does not state a fact that is required to be stated or that is necessary to make the statement not misleading; and (b) significantly affects, or would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on, the market price or value of a security.
Under the above two new sections, it is a criminal offence to issue a defective prospectus for raising funds from the public for firms.
It is apparent from the preceding discussions of the legal provisions of the United States, Australia and Canada that disclosure requirements of prospectuses are wide and the onus is on the issuer to determine the content and extent of information to be included in a prospectus. However, Australia prescribes some specific information to be disclosed. All these jurisdictions impose criminal liability for defective prospectuses but none of the three categorically identifies the persons who are criminally liable for such a prospectus. It must be noted that neither the U.S. nor Australia has amended the relevant provisions discussed above following the Enron effects on their domestic markets, but Ontario has added new sections by defining fraudulent conduct with regard to corporate disclosure that may trigger criminal liabilities for defective prospectuses. or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, shall upon conviction be fined . . . or imprisoned. . . . Section 17 of the SA'33 proscribes fraudulent interstate transactions in securities that include "offer or sale of any securities." Such conduct is "unlawful for any person" that may be involved in these transactions. But it does not clearly impose liability on particular persons.
Provisions regarding lodgment of prospectus with the SEC are clear. Unless exempted, companies willing to go public are required to lodge a registration statement 98 and prospectus 99 with the SEC for floatation; the contents of these documents are prescribed in sections 7 and 10 respectively. Sections 11 and 12 provide for civil liabilities for defective registration statements and prospectuses. Every person including directors, underwriters, auditors and lawyers may be liable for defective prospectuses under section 11.
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With regard to the importance of the role of accountants and lawyers, statutory provisions have been judicially interpreted in favour of accountants' criminal liability alongside the existence of civil liability. In State v. Tarzian the Court of Appeal of Arizona affirmed the criminal conviction of the accountant for auditing the accounts of the company which lodged misleading information with the securities regulator. 101 In applying criminal liability provisions, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit highlighted the need for investigation by accountants before providing a certificate of fairness and rejected the plea of ignorance. The court observed that the certificates of accountants in relation to corporate disclosures "can be instruments for inflicting pecuniary loss" on investors.
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Further, it is generally argued that the profession of auditors plays a crucial role in presenting a distorted financial position of the issuer.
103 Similar to the position of accountants, lawyers have been held primarily liable by several courts for a defective prospectus.
104 Therefore, both auditors and place before the Enron effects, but Canada increased this term from two years to five years in response to Enron and some domestic incidents. Canada has also increased pecuniary penalties from CA $1 million to CA $5 million (US $4.3 million), where Australia trails some distance behind with its lower pecuniary penalties.
CONCLUSIONS
After recent mega-scandals of corporate bankruptcy, public confidence in the quality of services provided by auditors has been dazed and quick legislative measures have been taken to prevent corporate malpractices.
134
The auditors' role is perhaps the most important of many roles played by accounting professionals and thereby they work as a gatekeeper in line with other professionals such as securities lawyers and merchant bankers. 135 However, the role of lawyers is also very important because primary functions of securities lawyers are to assist the underwriters in exercising due diligence in the preparation of a prospectus and to ascertain that the prospectus complies with all the legal requirements. 136 As members of the coalition, underwriters, attorneys and accountants jointly provide credible assurance to investors that prospectus disclosures are accurate. 137 It is thus reasonably argued that "the current post-Enron atmosphere demands more from capital market gatekeepers." 138 The foregoing investigation of the prospectus liability regimes in the U.S., Australia and Canada reveals some similarities and differences amongst these jurisdictions with regard to the offensive conduct, persons liable for that conduct, defences available to that liability and penalties enforceable upon conviction. A great similarity persists in relation to the identification of persons who should be held liable. All three jurisdictions seem to impose liability on any person who is involved in the issuance of securities, although different terms have been used. Expressions of law regarding the identity of persons who are potentially liable for defective prospectuses are ambiguous. Such an ambiguity is favorable to offenders who are entitled to take advantage of the "benefit of doubt," a fundamental principle of the administration of
